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Constitutional Law-Fair Trial and Free PressResolution of a Conflict
Petitioner was arrested and tried for the murder of his wife.
Massive harmful publicity preceded the trial. During the trial
the presence of news reporters in great numbers provided a disruptive influence. Held, that petitioner was denied a fair trial as
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
by the trial judge's failure to sufficiently protect the proceedings
from "massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity." Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)'
The instant case illustrates a growing problem encountered in
the attempt to deal fairly with an accused person in criminal trials.
Mass-circulation news coverage can threaten a defendant through
extensive publicity before the trial and by disruptive conduct of
news media personnel during the trial. This situation brings into
conflict two basic rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution-freedom of press, and due process of law accorded every
criminal defendant. This comment attempts to review the court's
past treatment of the problem and to outline steps in its resolution.
The principal case is the latest in a series concerning news coverage before and during a criminal trial. Although only a few
decisions have dealt with disruptive reporting during a trial many
have involved pretrial publicity. Some knowledge of these will
be helpful in assessing the impact of the principal case.
Until recent years, the Supreme Court required a person claiming
injustice in the criminal process to show essential unfairness as a
demonstrable reality.2 This doctrine required that a defendant
claiming unfairness from pretrial news coverage show that his
jurors, as an actuality, were affected by the publicity to the point
of being biased against him.' Under the early cases of juror's
statement of impartiality given upon examination was considered

IPetitioner's writ of habeas corpus was granted by the Federal District
Court, 231 F.Supp. 37 (D.C.S.D. Ohio 1964) on grounds that he was not
afforded a fair trial, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that
was not shown. 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965).
prejudice
2
Adams v. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
3Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
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presumptive of his fairness. 4 However, the Court later recognized
that such statements should not be dispositive when many of the
jurors promising impartiality had expressed preconceived notions
of guilt.'
In recognizing the increasing need for protection against outside
publicity, the Supreme Court began to assess the general community atmosphere created by the news media and initiated the
probability of unfairness theory.6 In one of the cases applying this
test, the Court held that massive pretrial publicity which had
permeated the trial community inherently deprived the defendant
of a fair trial.' The probability of unfairneses doctrine is at this date
the basic and most liberal test applied by the Supreme Court in
resolving the problem of pretrial news coverage.
The control of the conduct and impact of news reporters during
a trial has been the subject of little comment by the Supreme Court,
perhaps because this normally can be handled effectively by the
trial judge. In one recent case the trial court effectively guarded
against the adverse effects of pretrial publicity by granting a change
of venue and a continuance, but was held to have allowed irreparable harm to the defendant by condoning the use of television
cameras in the courtroom.8 The presence of television was held
to infer notoriety to the defendant and cause psychological distractions which effectively denied him due process.' Thus, from the
law prior to Sheppard, it appears that the defendant must be protected from the overwhelming presence of news media at the trial
as well as from pretrial coverage.
The principal case is a startling example of a trial judge's
unwillingness or inability to control both the effects of massive
pretrial publicity and the disruptive presence of news media in the
courtroom. Although the publicity before defendant's trial was
extensive and harmful to his cause, repeated requests for a change
4

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1960); Holt v. United States, 218
U.S. 5245 (1910); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).

Id. at 728.

6See

Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Rideau v. Louisiana,

373 U.S.
723 (1963).
7

Rideau v. Louisiana, supra note 6.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
L. REv.
329 (1965).
9
Estes v. Texas, supra note 8, at 550.
8

For comment see 34 ForDEnM
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of venue and continuances were denied. During the trial members
of the press were allowed to occupy a space inside the bar near
the defense table and the jury box. Reporters were allowed to
handle exhibits and generally developed a disruptive atmosphere.
The abuses in this case were so clear and abundant that it is of
little value in determining the minimum standards that the Supreme
Court will accept as protecting an accused person's right to due
process of law. The Court relied jointly on the inflammatory pretrial publicity and lack of judicial decorum at the trial.' Therefore
it did not require a showing of identifiable prejudice," but rather
relied on its recent decisions 2 and reversed because probability of
harm had been shown."3
In recognizing reversals as palliatives, the Court suggested several
remedial steps that could be taken to protect a defendant from the
adverse effects of news coverage. In the area of pretrial publicity,
much information may eminate from the police, prosecution, witnesses, or even the defense. The Court suggested that the trial
court might safely control the news media's source of supply by
prohibiting any lawyer, party, witness, or court official from
making an extra judicial statements relating to evidence, the identity
of witnesses, opinions of guilt or innocence, or anything relating
to the merits of the case."4 To control the conduct of news reporting
during the trial, the Supreme Court suggested implementation of
rules governing the use of the courtroom and limitation of the
number of newsmen allowed in the courtroom if their presence
tends to be disruptive. 5
The suggested means for dealing with the harmful effects of
news reporting focuses attention on the apparent conflict between
the right of the accused to due process 6 and freedom of press."
Although both of these fundamental rights must be protected, the
Supreme Court has held that the functions of the news media "must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
, Id. at 614.
12 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965).
10

13

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).

,4Id. at 619.
1
5 Id. at 618.

1
6 U.S.
17

CONST. amend. XIV.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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judicial process."' 8 In handling pretrial publicity, the courts have
little power to deal directly with the news media. In applying the
contempt power, they must show a clear and present danger to the
judicial process. 9 The Supreme Court cases involving newspaper
interference with the judicial process have strictly applied the clear
and present danger test and have uniformly reversed contempt
convictions, although in none of the cases was there a jury to be
intimidated or influenced.2"
In view of this attitude toward using the contempt power to
control outside publications, the trial courts will apparently have to
resort to other means to insure due process of law.
There are several existing legal tools which may be used to overcome the effects of pretrial publicity. Changes of venue are often
suggested as a remedy for this problem and in some cases would
probably be sufficient.2 ' If the defendant is a well-known figure,
however, or if news coverage had become very extensive, such
change would doubtless accomplish little. The use of a continuance
might also serve as a solution although it has been questioned
whether an accused should be forced to give up his right to a speedy
trial in order to secure his right to trial by an impartial jury.2"
Harmful effects of pretrial publicity might be detected by voir dire
examination of jurors and such effects might be minimized or overcome by the trial court's instructions. Practice has suggested that
neither voir dire nor court instructions are really very effective tools
in this area.2
Other methods of controlling pretrial publicity suggested in the
principal case-limited news releases by police, lawyers, or court
officials-may provide a solution both effective and harmonious
with the freedom granted to the press. Although news reporters
are highly critical of such proposed controls24 and legal writers have
18 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
'9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
20 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
21 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
22
Trescher, A Bar Association View, in Symposium-A Free Press and a
FairTrial, 11 VmL. L. REv. 677,709 (1966).
23 Id. at 711.
24
Graham, A Newspaperman's View, in Symposium-A Free Press and a
Fair Trial, 11 Vnr. L. REv. 677, 680 (1966).
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called for temperance in their application,2" the need for some
control is apparent.
Although the defendant's rights may be protected by the suggested methods, the eventual solution lies in a working agreement
between the news media and the judiciary. An initial acceptance of
the necessity for such controls and voluntary restraint by both
the press and the Bar should effect an harmonious solution to
the conflict.
lack William DeBolt

Evidence-Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony of Defendant
Physician When Called as Adverse Witness
P, brought a medical malpractice suit alleging that her colon
was torn by the negligent use of a bardex tube during X-ray
procedures in Ds' office. At the trial Ds were called as adverse
witnesses. The court refused to permit P to adversely examine Ds
on matters involving their judgment, knowledge and opinions as
experts. The trial court, directed a verdict for Ds. Held, affirmed.
In a medical malpractice action P will not be permitted to call a
defendant physician as an adverse witness and extract expert
testimony from him to prove a charge of malpractice. Hoffman
v. Naslund, 144 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1966).
It is well settled that a defendant physician can be called as an
adverse witness and be examined as to pertinent facts in the case.'
However, the issue is not settled as to whether such defendant
can be required as an adverse witness to give his expert opinion on
the matters in question. Although the courts are about equally
divided on this question, the trend is toward requiring defendant
physicians to give testimony involving their expert knowledge and
opinion when called as adverse witnesses.'
25

The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HA.v. L. REv. 91, 185 (1966).

26 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

27 Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1958).
1 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20,
203 N.E.2d 469 (1964); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915
(1931).
2 Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1186 (1963).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1967

5

